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Prefer:  ,lce reversal, or  choice/reservation-price  inconsistency,  has  been  documented  experimen- 
tally  for  zrtain  types  of  lotteries.  We argue  that  the  relevance of  these  findings for reaLworld 
markets is uncertain  because  the type of objects  used cannot  exist on  a market and because the 
extent  to  which  the  subjects  had  any  real interest  in  the objects  is  unknown.  Using  reaI-world 
lotteries,  we  have  tested  choice/price  consistency  on  subjects  who  prefer lotteries  ta  cash. 
Preference reversal was observed, but the frequency was much lower than in earlier experiments. 
There  were no  differences between  subjects  who  qualified as ‘lottery  interested’ and  those  who 
did not. 
1.  Intmduction 
Preference  reversal  has  been  documented  experimentally  for certain  types 
of lotteries,  decision-makers  and  environments.’  The  most  common  type  of 
preference  reversal  is  where  subjects  (a)  choose  a  lottery  with  a  high 
probability  of winning  a  low  amount  (a  ‘P-bet’) over  a  lottery  with  a  low 
probability  of winning  a high amount  (a ‘$-bet’) and (b) state  a higher selling 
price  for the  $-bet  than  for  the  P-bet.  Thus,  if choice  and  reservation  prices 
are  viewed as two forms  of preference expression, individual  preferences seem 
to  depend  on  what  form  is used, implying  that  preferences may  be reversed 
when  shifting from  one  form  to  another.  Such behavior  is inconsistent  with 
standard  microeconomic  theory  and  expected utility  theory. 
Since  the  robust  evidence  of  preference  reversal  is  limited  to  spedk 
situations  and,  in  particular,  since  some  writers  on  the  subject  have 
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‘The  classic study  by  economists  is Grether  and  Plott  (1979), which  was a critical replication 
of  the  studies  by  Slavic  and  Lichtenstein  (iY68)  and  Lichtenstein  and  Slavic  (197i).  Other 
important  studies  are those  by  Pommerehne  et  al. (1982) and  Berg et al. (1985). Recent studies 
include  Cox and  Epstein  ( 1989), Tversky et al. (1990) and Rostic et al. (1990). 
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interpreted  this evidence as damaging  to  standard  theory  of decision  making 
under  uncertainty  in  general  [e.g., &ether  and  Plott  (1969,  p.  623), Slavic 
and  Lichtenstein  (1983, p. 602) and  Tversky  and  Thaler  (1990, p. 20’41, the 
question  arises to what  extent  preference reversal  does exist for other  types  of 
objects,  decision makers  and  environments.  In  particular,  to  what  extent  can 
preference  reversal  be  observed  in  markets  concerning  regular  investment 
alternatives,  durable  goods,  and  other  objects  with  uncertain  payoffs?  In  a 
recent experiment  with used cars as payo&uncertain  choice objects  instead  of 
lotteries,  and with participants  who had  revealed an interest  in buying  a used 
car,  no  preference  reversal  was  observed  [Bohm  (1991)]. ‘Xow, given  that 
preference reversal -  to  our  knowledge  -  has  been observed  only  for certain 
lotteries  that  do  not  exist  on  regular  lottery  markets  (se?  below),  we  ask: 
Does  preference reversal  arise  for lotteries  t&t  do exist on  the  market  (real- 
world lotteries, for short)? 
In response to this question  we should  note  two important  facts. First,  the 
extent  to  which  the  subjects  used  in  laboratory  lottery  experiments  were 
representative  of real-world  lottery  consumers  is unknown.  With  the  excep- 
tion  of Lichtenstein  and  Slavic (1973), it  has  not  been  documented  that  the 
subjects  were interested  in  the  type  of objects  used  in  the  experiments,  e.g., 
by  being  at  least  occasional  buyers  of  lottery  tickets,  let  alone  buyers  of 
anything  close  to  the  quite  special  lottery  tickets  used  in  the  experiments.2 
This  means  that  subjects  who  reverse  preferences  may  be  individuals  who 
otherwise  would  not  buy  (these  or  any  other)  lottery  tickets  and,  thus,  that 
preference reversal would  be a minor  problem  for a theory  about  behavior  in 
real-world  lottery  markets. 
Second, the lotteries  used in previous  experiments  have  been of a type  that 
cannot  be found in the market.  They  have differed from most  non-laboratory 
lotteries  in several respects. 
-  The  laboratory  lotteries  had  positive  expected  values,  while  real-world 
lotteries  are sold for a profit  and  therefore  have  negative  expected  values for 
the  buyers.  In  particular,  it  should  be  noted  that  lotteries  of the  P-bet  type 
used  in  earlier  experiments  simply  could  not  exist  on  a  real-world  lottery 
market.  In  a typical  P-bet,  the  subject  is given  $5 with  a  probability  of 0.9. 
Then,  since the  sum  of prize;  for most  lotteries  is fdr below  100 percent  of 
gross receipts, typically  perhaps  around  50 percent,  this bet would  have to be 
sold  for around  $9. It  is hardly  possible  to  find  anyone  who  would  pay  $9 
for a lottery  ticket what  would give $5 with the probability  0.9! 
-  The  laboratory  lotteries  used one  or  two  prizes  only,  whereas  most  or  all 
‘In  the  oft-quoted  Las  Vegas  experiment  reported  in  Lichtenstein  and  Slavic  (1973)  subjects 
were ordinary  casino  patrons  -  presumably  gamblers  -  who  volunteered  to  participate.  However 
indisputable  the  value  of  this  rare  nonhypotheiical  test  is, it  should  be  noted  that  (a) the  games 
offered  were  new  and  of  the  on :-prize  type,  and  (b)  the  expected  payoff  of  each  new  round  of 
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non-laboratory  lotteries  have  complex  prize  plans,  i.e.,  several  prizes  with 
different probabilities. 
Here,  we  report  on  a  set  of  experiments  with  real-world  lotteries”  and 
with  subjects who  reveal  whether  or  not  they  prefer lotteries  to money.  More 
specifically, we investigate 
(1)  whether  preferences  reversal  is equally  frequent  with  real-world  lotteries 
as with the type  of lotteries  used in earlier  experiments; 
(2) whether  preference  reversal  is equally  frequent  among  those  who indicate 
an interest  in lotteries  as among  those  who do not; 
(3) whether  preference  reversal, to the extent  it arises, shows the same pattern 
for  real-world  lotteries  and  lottery-interested  subjects  as  in  earlier  experi- 
ments,  in  particular  a  higher  share  of preference  reversal  among  those  who 
choose  the  P-bet  than  among  those  who choose the $-bpt. 
In  addition,  we  test  behavior  concerning  lotteries  with  a  structure  similar 
to  that  used  in  previous  laboratory  experiments  -  a  single prize -  but  with 
probabilities  of winning  and  expected  payoffs  similar  to  those  of real-world 
lotteries.  This behavior  is then compared  with that  of the subjects in previous 
experiments  and  in our  experiment  with reatworld  lotteries. 
In  the  next  section  we  outline  the  basic  design  of  our  experiments.  In 
section  3 we discuss  how  the  design  relates  to  that  of earlier  experiments. 
The  details  of  the  experimental  procedure  are  presented  in  section  4,  the 
results  in section  5 and  concluding  comments  in section 6. 
2.  The basic experimenta  design 
It  turned  out  to  be  easy  to  find  sufficiently  different  real-world  lotteries 
which could  be interpreted  as representations  of the  P-bet  type  and  the $-bet 
type.  We  used  two  well-known  Swedish  state  lotteries  for  this  purpose. 
However,  straightforward  experimental  use of these  or  any  other  real-world 
lottery  tickets  did  not  seem  appropriate  here.  The  primary  reason  is  that 
such  iotteries  are  for  sale  ‘everywhere’ and  hence can  be bought  outside  the 
premises  of an experiment  for the given market  price. This  would affect both 
buying  reservation  prices  and  selling  reservation  prices.  Under  the  given 
conditions,  no  one  can  really  be  expected  to  be  willing  to  buy  at  a  price 
above  the  market  price,  and  most  people  should  be  willing  to  sell  at  any 
price above  the market  price. Thus,  reservation  prices for these lottery  tickets 
could  not  be expected  to provide  information  about  lottery  preferences.4 
Since, for the  reasons  just  given, it seemed unwise to  use real-world  lottery 
tickets  as  they  are,  we chose  to  use  shares  of packages  of  real-world  lottery 
*‘For  reasons  given  in  section  2  compounds  of  real-world  lotteries  were  used  in  these 
experiments. 
4This  problem  sometimes  appears  to  be  neglected,  e.g. in  the  ‘mug experiments’  presented  by 
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tickets. Such shares are a form of real-world  lotteries,  but  one that  cannot  be 
bought  rough  and ready  on an outside market. 
In  addition  to  using  real-world  objects,  we  designed  <NC test  SO a:  to 
reveal  whether  or  not  partici  ants  were ‘interested’ in  lotteries,  Le., whs;ther 
or not  they  were decision-ma  rs to whom  the  theory  in question  should  be 
particularly  applicable.  Here,  we recruited  a  group  of students  in  much  the 
same  way  as  in other  experiments,  but  allowed  them,  in a  first  round  of  the 
experiment,  to  choose  between  lottery  tickets  and  nz +ssy with  certainty  - 
more  specifically, money  in  the  amount  of  :he  price  of  the  lottery  tickets. 
Those  who chose a lottery  ticket  in such  a  situation  could  be interpreted  as 
being  interested  in lotteries,  since they  were  willing to  give  up  money  for  a 
lottery  ticket  just  as  a  real-world  lottery  consumer  does.  The  experiment 
would  thus  allow us to ctimpare  the behavior  of those  who choose  cash and 
those who choose a lottery  ticket  in the first round.  T  e lat ger group  i:, called 
‘interested subjects’ in the rest of the pa 
In  the  first  round  of  the  experiment  rticipants  were  given  the  oppor- 
tunity  to choose among  three alternatives: 
-  a sum of money with certainty  (SEK 40, approximately  equal  to $7) 
-  a share of a package with  P-bet lottery  tickets and 
-  a share of a package with $-bet lottery  tickets. 
The  ticket-price  value  of  each  of  these  packages  was  equal  to  the  cash 
amount.  After  this  choice  was  made,  participants  were  informed  that,  in 
addition,  th  lLey  would receive their  preferred  choices between  the  two  remain- 
ing alternatives.  In this ~vay, a ranking  of all three  alternatives  was obtained. 
the end  of the  first  part  of the experiment,  participants  were  told  t 
7Jvould  also be giveh the third  alternative,  and  that  they  would  now have 
an  opportunity  to sell one  or  b  of the  lottery  shares  they  had  been given 
and/or  buy  an additional  share.  ore specifically, participants  were asked  to 
state  at  what  prices  they  were willing to  sell and  at  what  prices  they  were 
willing to  buy. Given  their  buying  and  selling reservation  prices, equilibrium 
ices  were  established  and  lottery  shares  were  bought  a  L  sold  at  these 
prices.  The  choice  in  the  first  part  of  the  experiment  and  the  order  of  the 
ired  a  pair  of  shares  of  iottery  tickets  with  a  total  arket  value  of 
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SEX  40+  $-bet  over  SE  40+  P-bet.  We  return  to  this  problem  in  section 
5.3, where  we show  that  dties not jeopardize  our  inter  retation  of the  test 
results. 
of  ear 
3.1.  Non-hypothetica!  c  oices  and significant  object 
In  most  preference  reversal  experiments  subjects  make  a  large  num 
choices,  only  some  of  which  have  real  conseque  s.  By  some  rando 
mechanism  it  is  then  decided  which  lotteries  will  played  for  red  an 
which  will  remain  hypothetical.  Such  a  design  lowers  the  expected  payoff 
related  to  each choice,  often  down  to  q  ficant  levels?  By contrast, 
the  value  of the  alternatives  in our  experiment  irly  high (a market  value 
of SE  for each  alternative).  In  a  dition,  and  more  importantly  perhaps, 
al! choices are for real. 
3.2.  Real-world  ;dsi,ze  pm,  well-known  lotteries.  and non-trivial  prizes 
All previous  preference  reversal  tests  we  ave seen have  used lotteries  that 
are  not  found  in the  real  world.  In  , there has typically  been one or 
two  prizes, each  of a modest  size.  contrast,  our  experiment  refers to  state 
lotteries  whose existence  and  general  terms  are  well known.  The  prize plans 
of these  !otteries  contain.  at  least  seven  prize  sizes, some  of which  are  quite 
high, as is typical  of attractive  real-world  lotteries. 
3.3.  Rea! sales  and a market  with a wal  demand side 
Over  time, the literature  on preference reversal  has undergone  a somewhat 
strange  development.  In  the  early  literature,  su  arized  by  &ether  and 
Plott  (1979) and  well  represented  by  their  own  experiments,  the  basic  issue 
was  consistencv  between  choice  and  the  ranking  of  reservation  prices.  By 
contrast,  more  recently,  Cox  and  Epstein  (1989) and  Tversky  et al. (1990) use 
the  prices  elicited  from  each  participant  only  for  selecting  which  lottery  (if 
any)  he  is  given  the  opportunity  to  play.  Lottery  tickets  are  not  sold  -  or 
‘Tversky  et  al. (1990)  is  a  case  in  point.  They  use monetary  incentives  for a  minor  part of 
their tests. There, subjects have  a  15 percent chance  of actually taking part in a non-hypothetical 
round;  if so,  each  pair  of  the  bets  that  the  individual  is  confronted  with  has  a  i/6  chance  of 
being selected for actual play. There is, in addition,  G l/2  chance that the choice  between the two 
bets  in  each  pair  will  be  based  on  the  subject’s  stated  choice  between  them.  Thus,  when 
considering  what choice  to  make  between  two  bets, the individual  has a (15/100) x (l/12) = l/80 
chance  of playing  the one  selected. Taking the fair  of bets with the highest expected payoffs (no. 
l),  $3.88  vs. $4.96. we see  that  the  subject is asked  EO  zorsider  a choice  between  a bet with an 
expected  payoff of  almost  5 cents  and  another  with  an  expected  payoff of  a little  more than  6 
cents. A more general discussion  of this proble  arrlson ( 1989a and  19E9b). 332  P.  Bohm  and  H.  Lind,  Preference  reverscl’  and  lottery  subjects 
bought  -  at a!1 in these experiments.  Thus,  the experiments  are  not  related  to 
the  basic  issue  of choice/reservation-price  consistency.6  In  our  experiments, 
lottery  tickets are actually  bought  and sold by the subjects. 
Furthermore,  the market  for lottery  tickzts  in our  experiments  is organLed 
differently  than  in earlier  experiments  where  subjects  were  a!!owed  to  make 
real  ticket  sales. The  traditional  method  -  the  so-called  BDM  procedure  - 
has  been  to  draw  a  price  randomly  from  a  certain  interval.’  Those  who 
stated  a  selling price below  this  price sell their  tickets  at  the  random  price, 
other  participants  keep  their  tickets.  We  rejected  this  method  in  order  to 
avoid  introducing  elements  that  participants  might  regard  as  artificial. 
Instead,  the  demand  side  in  our  experiments  is  generated  in  a  way  that 
resembles the  demand  side on  real  markets,  i.e., demand  stems  from  people 
interested  in buying the objects  in question.8 
3.4.  The role of indiffirence  statemec’l  ts  “.A 
Grether  and  Plott  (1979) observed  the  potential  risk  of ‘spurious’  prefer- 
ence reversal if subjects were forced to state  preference between  objects  when 
in fact they were indifferent. it  turned  out, how  ver, that  few subjects  actually 
used an  option  to state  indifference (3 percent  er  less in &ether  and  Plott’s 
n addition,  it should  be noted  that  when there  are  three  choice 
objects,  as  in  our  experiments,  the  test  would  be  significantly  more  compli- 
cated  if  the  subjects  were  allowed  to  state  indifference.  (Instead  of  three 
alternatives  there  would  have  been  seven.)  This  addition  to  complexity  is 
hardly  worthwhile since preference reversal defined as 
BZ A  and  #(A)>$(&, 
(pR is  reservation  price)  is  as  relevant  for  analysis  as  preference  reversal 
defined as 
The  reason,  of  course,  is  that  according  to  standard  theory,  deviating 
reservation  prices, p”( ‘4)  > pR( B),  are  inconsistent  wit  not  only  strict  prefer- 
o indifference, B -  A.  exe,  we interpret  choice of Li  over 
‘Cox  and  Epstein  (1989)  p.  409,  write:  ‘The  design  of  our  experiments,  and  the  patterns  of 
reversals  that  they  produce,  both  differ  in  essential  ways  from  previous  preference  reversal 
experiments.  Thus  we will refer  to  the  reversals  that  we observe  as ‘choice  reversals’,  as distinct 
from  the  traditional  preference  reversal  phenomenon.’  It  is  hard  to  see  how  this  statement  is 
consistent  with calling  the experiment  a *preference reversal  experiment’. 
‘For  details  see, e.g., &ether  and  Plott  (1979). 
al  procedure  also  results  in  compound  lotteries  that  car.  lead  to  spurious 
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Table  I 
Number  of participants. 
--_~ 
Experiment  I: 
Department  Reabwarld  lotteries 
Mathematics  -  35 
Surveying  28 
Architecture  23  ---  -___ 
Experiment  II: 
Control  lotteries 
58 
A as  preference  for  B or  i 
reversal,  or inconsistency 
the  case 
lottery  tic 
rence  between 
ice and  reservation  prices, is then 
states  a  strictly  lower  se1 
4.1.  The  participants 
o  students  of  Econo  its  were  used  as  subjects.  The  participants  were 
ergraduate  students  at  the  epartment  of  athematics,  Stockholm 
rversity,  and  at  the  Departme  d  Architecture,  Royal 
Institue  of  Technology  (Stockholm).  e  students  were  contacted  by  us  in 
class  and  were  informed  t  at  ihey  could  sign  up  for  participation  in  an 
experiment  concerning  beh  ior  under  uncertainty.  They  were told  that  they 
could  earn  money,  but  that  no  specific sum could  be guaranteed  since actual 
earnings  would  be  deter-m  ed  by  an  element  of chance.  Although  nothing 
was  said  about  lotteries,  t  information  given  was  likely  to  attract  people 
interested  in  gambles,  which  was  just  what  we  wanted?  Betweeen  40 
percent  and  80 percent  of  those  informed  in  the  various  classes  signed  up; 
about  85 percent  of those  registered  showed  up. The  number  of participants 
in each experiment  is shown  in table  1. 
9By  this  definition  of  preference  reversa:,  r-_c.W  ==+Ypants  stating  identical  reservation  prices  witI 
never  be  regarded  a< preference  reversers  (or  violators  of economic  theory  in some  other  similar 
respect).  There  aiz  at  least  two  reasons  for  choosing  a  &&inition with  this  implication.  First,  this 
can  hardly  repro: snt  a  violation  of  standard  theory  as  long  as  such  behavior  can  be  explained 
by  the  natural  wish  to  state  bids  in  even  amounts,  which,  in  the  case  of  strict  preference  but 
‘almost  indifference’,  could  lead  to  this  kind  of response  p32ttern; moreover,  it is doubtful  whether 
one  could  ever  measure  ‘closeness  to  indifference’  -  except  perhaps  by  using  differences  in 
reservation  prices  (!).  Second,  and  perhaps  more  important,  costs  of  identifying  one’s  ‘exact’ 
reservation  prices  may  be  quite  high  and  probably  much  higher  than  for  identifying  which 
option  one  prefers.  Such  differences  in  costs  of  decision  making  can  explain  this  response 
pattern,  using economic theory. 
“The  information  given  to  the  students  is presented  in Appendix  1. 334  P. Bohn  and H.  Lind,  Preference  reversal  and  lottery subjects 
4.2.  The 6  dteries 
4.2.1. Exphnent  I: Real lo?Wy  tickets 
As  already  indicated  the  basic  idea  in  experiment  I 
tickets  that  are  sold  regularly  on  the  Swedish  market. 
e) lotteries  have  profiles  that  are  interesting  from  a 
point of view. 
was  to  use  lottery 
The  following  two 
preference  reversal 
The first lottery  -  used in the  role of the  $-bet  -  is Pe~~~~~~~~~e~~~~,  which 
has some high prizes, e.g. two  prices of SEK  1  n. On average  only  one 
ticket  out  of seven wins?  A ticket  costs  SEK  There  are  draws  twice a 
month,  with sales of around  750, 
The  second  lottery  -  used  in  -  is  TRISS-lotteriet. 
Prizes are fairly low, with no prize above SE  ne ticket  out  of five 
wins. A ticket  costs  S  K 20. Around  6 million  tickets  are  sold  each  month. 
Here, tke buyer  !earns whether  or not  he has won by scraping  the  surface of 
the lottery  ticket.’ 2 
In both  lotteries the total  prize WTIL  amounts  to 49 percent of gross revenue. 
As  the  $-bet  in  experiment  I  we  used  a  t  ird  of  a  package  of  three 
Penninglottesiet tickets.  The  P-bet  consisted  of  third  of a  package  of six 
Trisslotteriet tickets.  For  these  two  packages  of lotteries,  the  probabilities  of 
g are 0.37 and 0.74, respectively.‘3 The expected  payoff is the same for 
As we wanted  the participants  to  know  at  the  end  of the  session  v&ether 
they  had  won  or  t, the experiments  were carried  out  after  the  date  of t 
draw  of  a  $-bet.  rom  a  date  before  the  draw  and  up  to  the  eime of  the 
experiment, the lottery  tickets  were kept scaled in a trustworthy  fashion.14 
4.2.2.  Expevimen  ts II: Control experhen  t 
o compare  the outs;ome of the lottery  experiment  just  described  with that 
of  traditional  preference  reversal  experiments,  we  conducted  an  additional 
test, experiment  II, with a set of non-market  lotteries  s  ilar  to  those  used in 
earlier experiments. This test could  also prove  useful  n trying  to  indentify 
“The  complete prize  plans  can  be found  in 
’ ‘Accordmg  tc  markek studies  made  by  the 
pendiv  2. 
m administering  the  lotteries,  78 percent  of the 
population  have  heard  of  TRISS-lotteriet,  55  percent  know  it  well and  62 percent  have  bought 
tickets  in this lottery  at  least  once.  The  corresponding  figures  for  Penninglotteriet  are  90, 60, and 
74 percent. 
he  probability  of  winning  is equal  to  one  minu 
ret=  or  six lottery  tickets,  respective1 
proability  of  not  winning  on  any  of 
I-  (6/7)3 = 0.37 and  1 -  (4/5)6 = 0.74. 
he  participants  were  informed  of  t  ottery  tickets  during  this  period  had 
e  safe  of a  secretary  at  t P.  Bohm  and  H.  Lind,  Preference  reversal  and lottery subjects  335 
which aspect  of the  lotteries  in experiment  I was the cause  of a reduction in 
the number  of preference  reversals,  should  such a reduction  materialize.15 
ore  specifically,  the  non-market  lotteries  in  experiment  II  resemble  the 
lotteries  in earlier experiments  as far as  the simplicity of the prize plans is 
concerned, whereas the probabilities of winning and the ex  ted values were 
chosen  so  as to  resemble  those of the real-world lotteries 
The  S-bet  in  expzriment  II  had  the  same  pro 
origina  $-bet tickets in experiment I, i.e.,  1  in 7. 
tely the same probability as a pair of original P- 
the  probabilities  of  winning  in  experiment  I  (0. 
would -  for reasons stated below -  be meaningle 
used QIN  s  expected value as in the real lotteries, we woul 
up with the  owing three alternatives: 
ce of winning SE  (%-bet) 
ce of winning SEK 50 (P-bet). 
This clearly illustrates the problem of the relevance of the  P-bets  used in the 
earlier  experiments.  Few  people  can  be ex  ted  to  choose  the 
case. As compared  t  lternative  (1)  it ime  a 39  chance  of losing SEK 4~ 
and  a Z/5 chance  of  ning  SIX  101  Preliminary  investigations  slowed  thst 
if  we  raised  the  expected  value  of  the  lotteries  by  59  percen”.  all  thr% 
alternatives  would  stand  :;‘ chance  of  being  interesting.  I’&.-ef.?re,  the 
following alternatives  were used in experiment  II: 
(1)  SEK 40 
7 chance  of winning  SEK 210 ($-bet) 
5 chance  of winning  SEK  75 (P-bet)? 
4.3.  How the experiments  were  carried  out 
As a first step  forms  1A or  X1’  were  handed  out  and  participants  were 
told  to  state  in ‘writing  Jvhich of  the  three  alternatives  they  would  like  to 
receive. These  forms  include  the  prize  plans  along  with  the  probabilities  of 
winning  relevant  for  the  two  packages  of lottery  tickets  (in experiment  I). In 
“This  means  that  experiment  II  aiffers  from  thlr  traditional  preferance  reversal  experiments 
both  with  respect  to  object  value  and  experimental  setup.  If  the  share  of  preference  reversal 
turned  out  to  be  low  in this  control  experiment.  it  would  be necessary  to  investigate  the  role  of 
these  differences. 
161n this  experiment,  the  draws  were  made  by  taking  a  marble  from  a  bag  with  marbles  of 
different  colors  in proportions  representing  the  chances  of the  two  outcomes  in the  lotteries. 
“The  difference  between  1A and  1B is that  on  ._ L  _..  fn-  1A the  $-bet  is the  first  alternative  and 
the  P-bet  the  last,  while  on  1B the  P-bet  is  presented  first.  The  same  is  true  for 2A and  2B. 
Those  who  got  A-form  were  always  informed or  asked  about  the  $-bet  befare  the  P-bet,  and 
vice versa  for  those  who  got  B-forms.  All forms  are  presented  in Appendix  2. 336  P. Bohm and  H.  Lind,  Preference  reversal  and lottery subjects 
addition,  we  infomed  the  participants  about  the  general  characteristics  of 
the  two  lottery  z!ternatrves.  After  form  1 had  been  returned,  form  2  wap 
handed  out.  Here,  participants  were  to  state  which  of  the  remair;ring two 
alternatives  they would like to receive.” 
After  these  forms  had  been  collected,  the  participants  were  told  that  we 
wanted  everyone  to  be  on  an  equal  footing  in  the  next  stage  of  the 
experiment  and  that  they  would  therefore  receive  the  remaining  third 
alternative.  Particip  nts  were  then  informed  that  they  would  be  given  a 
chance  to  sell their  lottery  tickets  and/or  buy  one  more  ticket.”  For  each 
ticket  they  should  state  their  minimum  selling  price  (maximum  buying 
price).20 Participants  were told  that  the  ‘market’ price for each  type  of ticket 
would  be  the  price  where  there  were  as  many  buyers  as  sellers,  and  that 
transactions  would  take  place  at  this  price.  They  were  also  told  that  the 
procedure  was  such  that  there  was  no  point  in  trying  to  make  ‘tactical’ 
bids.” 
After the equilibrium  prices had been identified, lottery  tickets (or shares of 
packages  of  lottery  tickets)  and  cash  amounts  were  distributed  to  the 
participants  (SEK 40+ price of tickets sold -  price of ticket  bought).‘2 
5.  Results 
The  share  of preference  ~QVQM~S  in  experiment  I  is presented  in  table  2. 
The  participants  are  here divided  into  three  groups  reflecting their  choice  in 
the  first  round  (money,  $-bet,  P-bet).  For  each  group  the  first  part  of  the 
table  shows  the  number  of  participants,  the  share  of participants  revealing 
IsThe  full instructons  given  in  various  stages  of  the  experiment  are  available  on  request  from 
the  authors. 
19The participants  ;vere  given  the  opportunity  to  buy  only  one  additional  ticket.  (Participants 
seated  on  &d-numbered  chairs  were  given  the  chance  to  buy  an  additional  S-bet  ticket,  and 
those  on  even-numbered  chairs  another  P-bet  ticket.)  The  reasons  for  this  constraint  was  to 
avoid  unnecessary  complications.  In  er?riment  1, participants  were  informed  that  buyers  of 
additional  tickets  would  be  given  two  shares  in  the  same  package  of  tickets,  not  one  share  in 
each  of two  ,gackages. In experiment  II, buyers  would  receive  an additional  draw. 
20Form  3 was distributed  together  with  forms  4A,  4B  and  4Cl  (4C2)  for  potential  S-bet  (P- 
bet) buyers.  Selling and  buying  bids  -  in even  SEK  5 -  were  to  be <tated  on  forms  4A-C.  Before 
returning  forms  4A-C,  participants  were  requested  to  insert  the  reservation  prices  (stated  on 
..,-...:,A  forms  4A-C)  in form  3 and  to  keep  form  3 for  the  acmamu~i  of  ik  abA”II.  __“_._.a 
“Since  there  is no  (calculable)  point  in misrepresenting  reservation  prices  here.  we wanted  to 
gain  time  by  tIr,!ling the  participants  so.  Although  our  method  is  such  that  under  very 
exceptional  cir+Tdmstances a  small  gain  could  be  made  by  misrepresenting  one’s  bid,  the 
participant  has  no. way  of  knowing  whether  these  circumstances  hold.  Under  other  and  more 
general  circumstances,  a  loss  would  result  from  such  behavior.  Misrepresentations  can  therefore 
be expected  to lead to  losses more  often  than  gains. 
22For  readers  interested  in  the  costs  of  these  experiments,  lcittery  ticket  expenses  and  cash 
paid  to  the  participants  added  up to  some  SEK  11 000. Administraiivf  assistance  (t?:-  ?GYX  input 
aside from  planning  and  evaluating  the experiment)  amounted  to  some  30 man-hour::. P.  Bohm  and  H.  Lind,  Preference  reversal  and lottery subjects  337 
Table 2 
Preference reversal and choice/price  consistency: Experiment I. 
Money  first 
S-bet first 
P-bet first 
$-bet > P-bet 














Preference reversal  Choice/price consistency  with 
Different prices  Identical prices 
(per=N  (percent)  Wr=nt) 
13  33  53 
6  65  29 
22  22  56 
5  59  36 
23  27  50 
13 
70  - 
12 
45 
preference  reversal,  the  share  stating  a  higher  reservation  price  for  the 
preferred  bet,  and  the  share  stating  the  same  reservation  price  for  the  two 
bets.  The  total  results  for  the  two  orders  of  preferences  over  Iotter& 
independently  of the  preferences for money,  are shown on lines four and  five. 
The  last  four  lines  of  the  table  list  results  from  two  ear;!kr stud&  the 
seminal  study  by  Grether  and  Plott  (1979)  and  a  rcplization  made  by 
Pommerehne.  Schneider  and  Zwese! (P982). 
We focus first on  the  groups  that  chose  P-bets  over $-bets, which is where 
preference  reversal  has  been  most  prominent  in  earlier  studies.23 The  share 
of preference reversal  in this  group  was 23 percent. This share  is significantly 
lower  than  those  observed  in  G&  P  as  well  as  PS&Z.  The  share  of 
preference  reversal  in  the  present  study  lies outside  a  95 perent  confidence 
interval  (derived from  the  binomial  distribution)  assuming  that  the true  share 
was the relatively  low one observed  by  PS&Z. 
Of  those  choosing  $-bets  over  P-bets,  only  5 percent  stated  inconsistent 
responses.  With  a  share  as  low  as  this,  preference  reversal  in  this  group 
cannot  convincingly  be said  to deviate  from zero. In ail, 3 subjetts  out  of 56 
gave  inconsistent  responses.  Pure  misunderstandings,  and  mis?akes in filling 
out  the  forms, could  clearly  account  for  preference reversal  on -this order  of 
magnitude. 
Adding  the  two  groups,  the  share  of preference reversal  wzs as  low as  11 
percent.  This can  be compared  to overaii  shares of 36 pexenf  and 27 percent 
in the G & P and  PS & Z studies, respectively. 
To  test  whether  or  not  preference  reversal  is  more  common  among 
‘uninterested’  subjects,  i.e., those  who  preferred  money  in the  first round  (in 
‘31n some  studies,  notably  those  by  Lichtenstein  and  Slavic, the  ::Joint  of departure was that 
of a ‘theory of anchoring  and  adjustment’, on  the basis of  which prekrence  reversal is predicted 
in groups  that chose  P-bets  over $-bets and in such groups only. 338  P. Bohm and H.  Lind,  Preference  reversal  and  lottery subjects 
Table  3 
‘Interested’  vs. ‘uninterested’  subjects:  Experiment  I. 
-- - 
Order  of choice  Number  Preference  reversal  Choice/price  consistency  with  _  ____________-  ____  ____-  ____  ____  -  --- 
Different  prices  Identical  prices 
(percent)  (percent)  (percent) 
-_-  -- 
M-$-P  8  0  25  75 
‘-P-M  36  6  58  36 
($-M-P)  (12)  (8)  (83)  (RP 
=56 
M-P-$  7  29  43  29 
P-$-M  19  26 
(7:) 
68 
(P-M-S)  (4)  (0)  (25) 
=30  ----__-  -  --- 
Table  4 
Preference  reversal  and  choice/price  consistency:  Experiment  II. 
Number  Preference  reversal  Choice/price  consistency  with 
(percent) 
D&rent  prices 
(percent) 
Identical  prices 
(percent) 
Money  first  22  50  46  4 
$-bet first  15  0  100  0 
P-bet  lkst  20  70  5  25 
$-bet > P-bet  24  4  96  0 
P-bet > S-bet  33  73  9  18  -~-_  _--.  _ -  ---  -- 
-$-B  or  M-P-$),  we compare  them  with  those  who  chose  money 
respectively).  The  first  two  lines  of  table  3  show 
-bet over the 
5 show those who preferred  the  P-bet over  the $-bet ( 
omit those choosing money  in stage 2 from the analysis  (see lines 3 and  6). 
The  results  indicate  that  there  is  no  F&A,~:~  ‘,,*a~  difkrence  in  the  rate  of  _- 
preference reversal  twee  ottery-interested’  knoney  last)  and  ‘not  lottery 
interestzd‘ (money  first) subjects. Among  those  who chose  the  $-bet  over  the 
P-bet,  the  frequency  of  preference  neversal  is  about  the  same  for  the  two 
groups -  0 and  6 percent  re  is is also the case among  those who 
chose  the  P-bet  over  the  preference  reversal  is  26  and  29 
percent,  respectively.  Thus,  the  important  difference  is  still  between  those 
ho chose  the  P-bet  ihe  $-bet and  those  who chose  the  $- 
-bet, regardless of w  r money  was chosen  first or last. P. Bohm  and  H.  Lind,  Preference  reversal  and lottery subjects  339 
Table  5 
‘Interested’  vs. ‘uninterested’  sr,bjects:  Experiment  II. 
Order  of choice  Preference  reversal  Choice/price  consistency  with  _~~~_______-- 
Dflerent  prices  ldentieaf  prim 
(per=W  0  ~_  -~-- 
M-$-P  9  11 
$-P-M  5  0 
G-  4  610)  (Q) 
=24 
M-P-$  13  77  15  8 
P-S-M  5  8  0 
II51  tw)  4331 
-33 
table, they are  muc 
Plott  ( 1979). The  fact  that  probabilities  of  winning  and  ex 
our  test were comparabl  6 large real-world  1 
of  preference  reversal.  oreover,  when  the  choice  and  statement  of  the 
reservation  prices  were  moved  closer  in  time,  with  no  other  choices  in 
between,  contrary  to  most  earlier  experiments.  the  share  of  preference 
reversal  was  not  reduced.  The  question  remains- as  to  whether  or  not  the 
high share  of preference  reversal  in ex  riment  II, as compared  to experiment 
I, is caused  by the differences in prize  ans  or the mere fact that  the lotteries 
in experiment  II were unfamiliar  to the participants. 
We  may  also  note  that,  in  contrast  to  the  real-world  lotteries  of 
eriment  I,  and  in  line  with  most  lotteries  used  in  earlier  studies,  P-bets 
are  chosen  before  $-bets  in  most  of the  cases. In  experiment  II,  P-bets  were 
the  first  lottery  choice  in  58  percent  of  the  cases  as  compared  to  only  35 
percent  for experiment  I. 
Table  5 shows that  just  as in experiment  I, the results do  not  indicate  that 
preference  reversal  is more  common  among  those  who chose  money  fast.  In 
this  case  as  weil, the  significant  difference is between  those  who  choose  the 
P-bet  before  the  $-bet  and  those  who  choose  the  $-bet  before  the  P-bet, 
regardless  of whether  money  is chosen first or last. 
We  should  note  that  no  one  who  preferred  money  to  lotteries  (i-e., 
‘uninterested’  subjects)  in  experiment  I  or  II  stated  buying  prices  above 
SEK 40.24  The  median  buying  prices  stated  by  this  group,  with  the 
exception  of  P-bets  in  experiment  II,  were  lower  thain  those  stated  by  the 
group  who  chose  a  lottery  ticket  first  (‘interested  subjects’). Of  course,  this 
kind  of  behavior  is  to  be  expected  from  those  whom  we  regard  as 
‘uninterested’ vs. “interested’ decision-makers. 
*‘The  distribution  of the  buving  and  se”.ling  prices  is given in ~~~~dix  3.  .  - 340  P. Bohm and  H.  Lind,  Preference  reversal  and lottery subjects 
From  a  comparison  of  the  reservation  prices  in  experiments  I  and  i9  it 
appears  that  a lottery  loses some of its attraction  when a few high  prize3 are 
replaced by a large nun&r  of low prizes, with the expected  payoff remaining 
the same or -  as here -  somewhat  higher. A reasonable  hypothesis  is that  the 
less  attractive  the  lotteries,  the  greater  the  frequency  of  pure  mistakes  in 
decision making, and  hence of false preference reversals. This  is supported  by 
our  results.  If  behavior,  whereby  a  subject  chooses  a  lottery  ticket  before 
SEK 40, but  states a seliing price below SE  40 for this  ticket,  is interpreted 
as a pure  mistake  we can  note  that,  in experiment  I, only  one  subject  out  of 
71  behaved  in  this  fashion,  whereas  with  the  less  attractive  lotteries  of 
experiment  II, the number  of such ‘mistakes’ increased  to 8 out  of 36.25 
5.3.  Sorpte  comments 
The frequency  ef stating the same reservation price for  both lotteries 
In  the  experiment  with  real-world  lotteries,  rhe share  of participants  who 
stated  the  same  reservation  price for  the  lottery  tickets  was  rather  high  (42 
percent). The fact that  the  packages  of lottery  tickets can  be evaluated  using 
given  market  prices  and,  if so, come  out  the  same,  is likely  to  play  a  role 
here. This  is supported  by  the  lower number  of subjects  who  state  the  same 
price  in  experiment  II,  whir:.  no  information  can  be  provided  in  terms  of 
given  market  prices.  It  should  be  observed,  however,  that  the  Iece1 of  the 
market  prices in experiment  I did not  play  any  significant role in determining 
the selling prices (see Appendix  3). 
Possibie ‘por~olio effects’ 
In  section  1  we  noted  that  &Ferences  between  choice  and  ranking  of 
selling prices in our experiments  could arise from changes  in the composition 
between  the  first  part  of  the  experiments,  where 
where  reserva ti  prices  are  stated. 
chooses  the  P 
e  pricing  stage,  a 
ther  words, the  riskier  $-bet may  be 
is the  case at  the  pricing  stage  - 
that  he will receive SEK 40 in cash. Let us look  at our  results  in the light  of 
this possibility. 
some of the observed  preference reversals  were caused  by  portfolio 
I’.  pri;l::ple,  :his  be 
inferior  yod. 
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effects  of  the  type  just  described,  the share  of ‘pure’ preference reversal would 
be  even  lower  than  that  reported  in  section  5.1.  Thus,  our  tentative 
conclusion  th?t  the  use  of  real-world  lotteries  (as  compared  to  one-prize 
lotteries  with  expected  values  of  the  same  order  of  ma&etude)  leads  to  a 
lower  share  of preference  reversal  would,  if anything,  be strengthened  by  the 
possibility  of such ‘spurious’ preference reversals. 
Second,  it  is  important  to  note  that  preference  reversals  cannot  be  fully 
explained  by portfolio  effects. In fact, preference reversals  were as frequent  in 
group  M-P-$, where no portfolio  effects can arise, as in group  P-S- 
The  relevance  of the  procedure  invariance  hypothesis 
The  most  popular  theory  about  the  causes  of preference  reversal seems to 
be the ‘procedure  invariance  hypothesis’, according  to *dvhich  the procedure  of 
eliciting  preferences  can  affect the  preferences  observed  [see, e.g., Tversky  et 
al.  (!WO)  and  Tverskv  and  Tbaier  (!9  r! earlier  version  of this  theory 
states  that  responses  tend  to  be ‘anchored’ in a salient  feature  of the  lottery, 
seemingly  the most  relevant  for the  question  raked,  and  then  ‘adjusted’ when 
other  features  of  the  lottery  are  noted.  Thus,  when  asked  about  (re’lative) 
reservation  prices,  relative  prizes  would  come  to  mind  first, while probabili- 
ties would  play  a secondary  role. It is obvious  that  ths  version  of  the  theory 
is  hardly  applicable  to  real-world  lotteries  where  the_*e is  no  one  prize  to 
which  a  price  judgment  could  be anchored. 
Tversky  et  al.  (1990)  present  results  from  a  set  of  tests  interpreted  as 
supporting  the  procedure  invariance  hypothesis.  However,  these  tests  are 
questionable  for  several  reasons  (as  noted  in  footnote  3).  For  example,  they 
analyze  primarily  hypothetical  choices  or  use  trivial  incentives.  Moreover, 
there  is no  market  where  selling  reservation  prices  can  play  a  role. 
6.  Summary  and conch 
(1)  We  have  seen  that  even  when  real-world  lotteries  are  used  as  choice 
objects,  preference  reversal  appears  with  some  frequency.  In  our  experiments, 
the  overall  frequency  was  11 percent. 
(2)  This  frequency,  however,  is  significantly  lower  than  that  observed  in 
earlier  experiments  using  non-market  lotteries. 
(3) There  was  no  dif%rence  in  preference  reversal  between  lottery-interested 
and  lottery-uninterested  subjects,  where  lottery  interest  was  defined  by  the 
subjects’  choice  of  lotteries  over  money. 
26As  portfolio  effects  can  arise  only  among  ‘interested’  subjects,  the  existence  of  significant 
portfolio  effects  would  reopen  the  case  for  PrefereEce  rcvcrsal  as  a  phenomenon  primarily  among 
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(4)  As  in  earlier  lottery  tests,  preference  reversal  occurred  primarily  for 
those  who  chose  P-bets  over  $-bets.  The  frequency  was  23  percent  in  this 
group  (experiment I). 
(5) Preference reversal  was so rare  among  those  who chose  S-bets over  P- 
bets  (3  out  of  56) that,  for  this  group,  preference  reversal  does  not  exceed 
what can be expected as a result of pure mistakes. 
(6) The  group  where  preference reversal  is most  often  observed  (where  P- 
bets are chosen over $-bets) has been dominant  in many  previous  tests using 
non-market  lotteries.  For  the  real-world  lotteries  used  in  experiment  I,  this 
group  accounted  for  only  35 percent.  A possible  explanation  is  that  people 
tend  to shift to a preference for the $-bet  if the  prize range  is widened, i.e., if 
the (higher) prizes become more spectacular. 
(7) Thus,  the  overall  low  frequency  of  preferences  reversal  for  real-world 
lotteries  is explained  by  the fact that  (i) preference reversal  is less frequent  in 
the group  where it constitutes  a (significant)  problem,  viz. those  who choose 
P-bets  over  $-bets, and  (ii) this group  is smaller  for real-world  lotteries  than 
for lotteries  of the type  used in earlier experiments. 
Comparing  the real-world  lottery  experiment  (experiment  I) with an eariier 
test  of  choice/price  consistency  using  real-world  payoff-uncertain  objects 
(used  cars),  w  ere  no  preference  reversal  was  found  [Bohm  (1991)],  the 
question  centers  on  the  reason  for  this  difference. A  number  of candidates 
can  be  listed:  known  vs  unknown  object  prices,  knoqwn vs  unknown 
probabilities,  objects  with  actual  market  prices  aroung  $7  or  $l,QOO,  out- 
comes  expressed  in  monetary  units  or  not,  and  the  presence  vs  absence  of 
pure gambling. 
Appendix 1: Information to prospective participants 
The following information  was given to the prospective  participants: 
6 
.*.  (general  introduction)  . . .  We  are  running  a  series  of  experiments  to 
increase  our  understanding  of  people’s behavior  under  uncertainty,  that  is, 
how  people  choose  among  objects,  the  values  of which  are  not  known  in 
advance.  Since many  objects  are  of  this  type  -  stocks,  used  cars,  durable 
consumer  goods, etc. -  economists  have  become more and  more  interested  in 
how  people  behave when  the consequences  of choosing  a certain  alternative 
are uncertain. 
We  are  planning  an  experiment  where  you  are  invited  to  participate.  If 
you do, you would not  only contribute  to increasing  our  knowledge, but  also 
earn  some money. How much depends  partly  on your  own choices, partly  on 
chance -  as just  mentioned,  we are intereted  in behavior  under  uncertainty. 
An experiment will be held on date  X in room  Y. It is expected  to last one 
hour  and  a half. If you  want  to participate  you  can sign one of the lists that 
are now being circulated.  .  .’ Appendix 2  Forms and prize plans  343 
Forms  for experiment  I are  shown  here. Those  used in experiment  II  were 
similar. 
Check wbat you prefer to obtain: 
q  A third  of  three  ‘Penninglotter’,  ticket  price  SEK  40 
0  SEK  40 
fJ  A third  of  six  ‘Trisslotter’,  ticket  price  SEK  20 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
signature 
Prize  plans 
The  ticket  price  is SEK  40.  . . .On  the  average 
you  win  on  one  ticket  out  of  seven 
Prize  plan  for  sales  of  350,000  tickets 
Number  of  Value  of 
prizes  Prize  PriJ= 
z  X  I.W.Wkr=  ZOOO.~kr 
1  X  500.000  kr =  500,Okr 
5  X  NMKJOOkr=  5OO.OODkr 
10  x  5O.ooO  kr =  5W’KKIkr 
75  x  1O.OOOkr=  750,fMl kr 
100  x  5.000 kr =  5OC.WOkr 
800  x  l.OoOkr=  800,MNbkr 
900X  5OOkr=  45OBOO  kr 
lLOO0  x  150kr=  1,$00.000&r 
zx500  X  lOOkr=  2,250,000  kr 
45.m  x  8Okr=  3,6WOW  kr 
26,250  X  new  ticket  4Okr=  1.05O.MMI  kr 
107.643  14~700,OaI kr 
If  the  number  of  tickets  is  changed 
-  in  the  amounts  of  3,000  tickets  only  - 
the  prize  plan  is adjusted  as  follows: 
1  x 
1  x 
6  X 
6  X 
48  x 
90X 
180  X 
105  X  new  ticket 
lO.O00kr= 











7200  kr 
9,000 kr 
14AOO  kr 
4,200 kr 
437  58,800 kr 
1.1  each  ticket  is SEK  20.  . . . On  the  average 
you  win  on  every  f%Ih ticket 
I  t 
Prize  plan  for  sales  of  OOU  tickets 
(the  prize  ptan  is  adjusted  prqortionally  to 
Number  of 
P* 
60X 
LZ  “x 
45,000  x 
i80,oaI  x 
4sz7aI  x 
489.6tm  x 
changes in sales) 
Value  of 
The  chance  of winning  any  prize  is 4 in  10 with  a  package  of ‘Penninglotter’,  while the  chance  is 
b  in  10  with  a  package  of  Trissfotter.  The  size  of  the  average  prize  is  higher  for  the 
‘Penninglotter’-package  .- double  that  of  the  ‘TrissSotter’-package. 
[For  simplicity,  the  probabilities  were  rounded  off: 0.37 to  0.4 and  0.74  se, 0.8. The  fatter  figure 
was  chosen  to  keep  the  correct  relation  between  the  lotteries.] 344  P. Bohm and H.  Lind,  Preference  reversal  and lottery subjects 
0  A  third  of  three 
[3  SEK  40 
This form contains t  same set of alternatives as t 
Cross out the alter  t you have just  chosen. 
the two rern~~~~~g  alternatives t  t yw  prefer to obtain. 
‘Penninglotter”,  ticket  price  SEK  40 
0  A third  of  six “Trisslotter‘.  ticket  price  SEK  20 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . 
signature 
vhe  rest  of  this  form  was  identical  to  the  second  half  of  form  IA. 
Summary  statement: 
A third  of  three  nningiotter’,  ticket 
h  thl.rd of  six ‘T  lotter‘,  ticket  price 
SK  48 
he 
of six ‘TRISlotter’  for is: P. Bohm  and  H.  Lind,  Preference  reversal  and  lottery subjects  345 
Are you  interested in  selling  your t  of  the  age sf t 
PRICE,  SEK  (Pbse  check] 
If  YOU  iii%  iiOt  Wi  rung  t0  SW  -p:-  -9  at any  of  these nr;-  p-s,  state  the  Iowest  pi-ice  the  y@u are waing  to 
sell  to even  SEK  5: 
I  wi  id  of  alie  three  ‘Pennin  e price  is at least  SEK..... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . 
signature 
Are you  interest  in  buying another  t  age  of  three ‘~~NN~~~~~er’? 
PRICE,  SEK 
YES. 
I’ll  buy  if 
the  price is 
(Please  check) 
NO 
I won’t  buy  if 
the  price is 
(Please  check) 
120  . . . . ..“..........................  . . . . . . ..I....................  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
115  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..-  . . . . . . . .  ..I...................  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  ..I........ 
110  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..I....... 
15  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . _...........I..................  . . . . . . . . ..I................ 
10  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . ..‘......................-...............-..  ..‘...... 
5  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..-..............................  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..-..-..... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
signature 346  P. Bohm and H.  Lind,  Preference  reversal  and lottery  subjects 





























Experiment  I. selling  prices. 
First  choice 
$-bet  ~_..___  ---  -  -_ 
$-bet  P-bet 
P-bet 
$-bet  P-bet 
money  . 





















































































Experiment  11.  buying  prices. 
____  ____  ___  __ 
























P-bet -  P-bet 








$-bet  P-bet 
6  9 
28  15 P.  Bohm and H.  Lid,  Preference  reversal and lottery  subjects  347 
EX  -  ent  II.  selling  prices. 
--  --___  -~ 
SEK  P-bet 
<35  IQ 
5 
3 
35.58  4  7  6  3  3  3 
1  2  2  2  1 
1  E  0  2  0 
‘p 
;;  Q  0  0  2  Q  0  4  0  0  Q 
4  8  1  E  1  8 
1  8  0  0  0 
Sum  16  16  28  20  22  22 
72  4Q  50  48  58  35  __- 
Experiment  II.  hying  prices. 
First  choice 
SEK 
S-bet  P-bet  mmey 
-~  ____  -  __  -__- 
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